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One of the chief merits of the "case-method" of legal study was the training it gave
to the student in the use of the original materials in use by the courts in the development of the law. The early case books represented the general opinion of that day that
the law was developed by the application and new extension of the principles which had
been applied in the decided cases of the past. These two case books show strongly the
influence of the modem idea that much material which is not to be found in the reported cases enters into the make-up of the law. 'In very few fields of the law can this theory
be better demonstrated than in the field of trade regulation, and a comparison of two
new case books on the topic of the law, each by a recognized authority on the subject,
offers an opportunity to examine how these extra-legal materials can be collected and
presented to the modem student. Such an examination cannot be made in a review of
the books written before much experience in their use.
Both books cover very largely the same materials, but the order is somewhat different. Professor Handler follows his historical introduction with materials on the common law as to restraint of trade and combinations, and then takes up the Sherman
Anti-trust Act. Then the subject of trade marks and trade names, and the various
forms of unfair competition and other illegal practices are considered, leading to a consideration of the Clayton Act and the later statutory attempts to control industry by
statute or administrative agency. Professor Oppenheim takes up trade marks, unfair
competition and other forms of control before he deals with the problems of restraint of
trade and monopoly. Each arrangement has some advantages not possessed by the
other, and both have the disadvantage, which is the bane of all editors of case books,
of requiring many cases to appear before others which are really essential to their-complete understanding. Since the early activity of governmental interference in this country took the form of protection of competition, rather than of regulation, the reviewer
prefers the arrangement of Professor Handler for use in a course where the emphasis is
upon governmental control, rather than upon the mutual rights, privileges and duties
of competitors.
Professor Handler devotes more than one hundred pages to a preliminary discussion
of the development and general characteristics of the business system. He has gathered
here much early historical material that otherwise would not be accessible to the student, and has combined it with excerpts from standard authorities. Probably very
few teachers of the course would have time to cover this material even superficially, in
view of the fact that our modem experience in this field is based on such radically different premises "thatthe early history of the law in this field is of much less value than
in most others. Professor Oppenheim's eighty-seven page introduction is composed
very much more largely of his own statements, and deals more with the present, than
with the historical aspects of the problem. It is a general preview of all of the problems
to be considered in the course. It is hard to see why the editor felt it to be necessary to
devote nineteen pages of this introduction to a reprint of portions of the opinions in
the Schechter case. That case had an important political effect, but it seemingly has
made very little contribution to our law upon the subject of trade regulation.
In both case books, there is a wealth of material in the footnotes, in addition to that
incorporated in the text itself. The attempt has apparently been to make the footnotes
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exhaustive rather than selective. For the instructor's use, that may be desirable,
though very few instructors would be able to read all of this material in preparation for
teaching the course for the first time, and certainly no one could expect any student
to become familiar with even a small fraction of it. It is at least open to question if the
books would have been more useful to the students if the editors had undertaken the
task of selecting from this mass of material only so much of the best as it would be possible for him to read. How far are we justified in expecting a student to pay for material which is useless to him but which saves the instructor a good deal of time that would
otherwise have to be spent on digests and indexes? But there is no question that this
material would be of immense value to any practicing lawyer who has cases in the field
covered by these collections. Either book will give him excerpts from much material
to which he could not otherwise have access without considerable trouble, and besides
will give him references to practically all of the cases and legal writings on the problem
he has at hand.
But the criticisms that can be made of either of these two books are trivial when
compared with their merits. A teacher of a course on trade regulations ought to be
profoundly grateful if he had the use of only one of these books, when he has the opportunity to choose between them, and to use the best of each to guide his own thinking
on the subject, he must realize how fortunate he is.
H. L. McCINTocK*
How Lawyers Think. By Clarence Morris. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
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There seems to be an inverse relation between the ability to expound a systematic
theory of an art and successful work in that art. The greatest advances in science
have been made by men who either have no explicit theories of scientific method or
who, when they talk about 'how they think' at all, talk badly. The world's greatest
music and poetry have been the work of men who had no dearly formulated theories
of these arts. Political scientists have not built empires and there appears to be little
connection between the acquisition of great wealth and the ability to formulate economic theories systematically. It is obvious, then, that to do or make things well one
need not be able to make explicit the nature of one's activity. However, in order to
communicate to others what it means to do or make things weil, one must be able to
exhibit the principles of the art he is attempting to teach. Mr. Morris's book, How
Lawyers Think, undertakes to do this for the art of "legal problem solving."
He says, "It is an attempt to generalize expressly on the subject of the solution of
legal problems so that the student of the law may have a systematic theory which may
be useful in formulating or criticizing habits of thought." Such a theory Mr. Morris
attempts to provide by a few hundred words each on such topics as "The Natural
History of Problem Solving," "Past Experience and Present Problems," "Logic and
the Solution of Problems," "Immediate Inference," "Syllogisms and Problem Solving," "Classification and Definition," "The Extension and Intension of Terms," "Inductive Logic," and "Theory and Reasoning." The briefness of Mr. Morris's presentation is not due to his skill in grasping essentials nor to his extraordinary capacity for
contracted exposition. On the contrary, despite the slightness of his book, it wanders
at random high above 'the surface of dozens of the chief problems of metaphysics,
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